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Single-valued core selection, equity and aggregate monotonicity are desirable properties for 
cost allocation but offer challenges to develop suitable allocation methods to satisfy. This 
paper attempts to develop a new solution approach to meeting these properties. The idea is 
first to identify the critical value of the grand total cost for non-empty core, using an LP to 
maximize the grand cost subject to individual and group rationality conditions. The critical 
grand cost is then allocated by any single-valued core allocation methods available such as 
the nucleolus and its variants. The non-critical grand cost values are allocated simply by 
scaling up or down from the critical case so as to ensure aggregate-monotonicity. In addition, 
a new core allocation method is proposed for the critical case, based on prorating the best and 
worse costs that are feasible bounds for each player in the grand cooperation. Existence of 
such proration fractions is proved along with lower and upper bounds identified explicitly, 
which indicates some sense of equity. The new method is found to be desirable for the cases 
with two or three players, and more research is being conducted for general cases of more 
than three players. 
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